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Book Review of Sex & Social Justice,
by Martha C. Nussbaum

Margaret Urban Walker
Fordham University

Sex & Social Justice. By Martha C. Nussbaum. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999. Pp. 486. $35.00.

This volume from Martha Nussbaum collects 15 essays written
during the period 1990-97, 14 of them previously published but
rewritten for this book, and one new piece. Followers of Nussbaum's
recent work will find the matter of the opening essays familiar, as they
reprise themes about sex equality and the welfare of women that she
has taken up within the "human capabilities" ethical framework on
display in two previous volumes Nussbaum co-edited with Amartya
Sen (The Quality of Life, 1993) and with Jonathan Glover (Women,
Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, 1995),
both studies prepared for the World Institute for Development
Economics Research (WIDER) of the United Nations University. In the
acknowledgments in the present volume, Nussbaum credits to her
experience with WIDER between 1986 and 1993 "a new sense of
empirical reality and of the historical and political complexity" of issues
of justice (viii).
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Some readers might yet be surprised by some features of this
project: John Stuart Mill looms larger here than Aristotle, and the neoKantian flavor is strong. The framing concepts here are liberal staples
of dignity, equal worth, and liberty. The book takes up its topic, not
simply in the spirit of liberalism, but in the spirit of a liberal rationalism
whose message is not only that rationally gifted beings are and must
be self-disposing over a wide extent of their private and public lives
(Mille an non-interference) but also that a life itself should be
"organized by critical reasoning" (Stoicism via Kant) (10). Moreover, in
the battle for human dignity, Nussbaum holds, "if we fight with any
weapon other than rational argument, we will have given our
adversaries the greatest victory that they could possibly win, that of
debasing our humanity" (331). The author also describes the approach
as feminist in a way that is internationalist, humanist, liberal,
concerned with the social shaping of preference and desire, and with
sympathetic understanding (6-14). While fineness of perception of
particular human beings and richness of response to their minutely
perceived situations is a signature theme for Nussbaum, the last
concern here takes a back seat to a set of analytical exercises and
strongly framed arguments for liberty and dignity unsullied by
irrational prejudice related to matters of "sex."
The subject "sex" comprehends a broad territory here,
including: biological sex and the norms of gcnder it attracts in every
culture; sexuality; sexual behavior and sexual desire; sexual
objectification; paid sex work; same-sex relations now and in the
ancient Greek world. In an essay that provides an admirably clear
introduction to the idea of the "social construction" of feelings, she
views the "sexual domain" of human life as one of "symbolic cultural
interpretation, shaped by historical and institutional forces, though
within constraints imposed by biology," so that "cultural formations
affect not just the theoretical explanation of desire but the very
experience of desire, and of oneself as a desiring agent" (56). This,
Nussbaum says, does not foreclose rational debate or lead to
relativism; instead, it "opens up a space for normative argument,
political criticism, and reasoned change" (56). Topically, the essays
address the situations of women generally and of lesbians and gay
men because "human dignity is frequently violated on grounds of sex
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or sexuality" (5). The essays repeatedly put the question: What kinds
of moral, legal, and political treatment respect the dignity of human
beings when sex is, in any of these ways, at issue? The answers are
for the most part as you might expect in a liberal feminist viewgenerally, complete legal and social equality for women and those not
heterosexual, strong objections to religious restrictions on women's
legal and civic status and to traditional practices of non-trivial genital
cutting. But there are valuable additions, such as an effective
discussion of how problematic categories for "sexual orientation" really
are, and some surprises, such as a mitigated (and somewhat classbound) defense of prostitution.
For those used to the literary and dramatic prose of some of
Nussbaum's other work, this volume will read on the whole as a tract
and locally as a series of briefs. This seems to be the author's purpose,
and it is a strength of the book. This work is devoted to the "urgent"
need for "moral stand taking" (31). At its best, it is instructive and
seems clearly intended to instruct as it persuades. It instructs by
"making cases" in a stepwise, conceptually crafted, and sequentially
argued way, often buttressed by empirical research. For this reason
the tone is largely didactic or forensic. While those steeped in
literatures of feminism or gay and lesbian studies will find some of
these discussions (or some parts of them) at the level of a primer,
they might enjoy seeing familiar points rehearsed without obtrusive
and excluding jargon and seeing the liberal cases put in aggressively
linear form. These essays could make good instruction pieces for
students as well, teaching the virtues of clear statement and argument
while defending worthy and humane points about social inclusion and
fairness.
At the same time, this didactic form has the vices of its virtues.
At 373 text pages, the lesson goes on for a long time, and the
instructor is often peremptory in defining the subject. Nussbaum does
not hesitate to tell "feminism" what to be and do, while it would be
more gracious and critically productive to engage in more breadth and
depth with a varied and sophisticated literature now several decades
along (notes for chapter 2 include references amounting to a very brief
syllabus). This more sustained conversation might move Nussbaum to
reconsider her claim that "wherever you most mistrust habit, there
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you have the most need for reason" (79). Mature feminist criticism has
repeatedly shown that reason is most needed where one trusts habit,
including habits of using philosophical vocabularies like that of
liberalism. Contrary to her account of it, liberal theory was not
produced by ignoring (l0) or failing to notice (64) that women were not
comprehended in theory, or by failing to follow their thought to its
conclusion (65). It carefully constructed a view of political life in which
women had a quite determinate, indeed ineliminable, structural role
that involved their socially normed sUbsumption by men. More
untrusting critical scrutiny is required to assess how thoroughly we are
freed from this subsumptive and exclusive universalism of
Enlightenment thought, with its logic of qualification (usually in terms
of "rationality") for equality and its entitlements. For Nussbaum's
purposes, the use of this vocabulary needs to be thought through in
relation to the capabilities approach.
Nussbaum reiterates her foundational view that an "account of
the central human capacities and functions, and of the basic human
needs and rights, can be given in a fully universal manner, at least at
a high level of generality, and ... this universal account is what should
guide feminist thought and planning" (8). But two issues remain elided
here. Even the strongest argument for a universally recognized set of
capabilities that are characteristically human will not support robustly
nornlative claims that these capabilities should or must be supported
equally or in the same ways or in the same people to the same degree
and to the same ends. Even as she acknowledges that the position on
capabilities is "evaluative from the start," Nussbaum minimizes the
nature of the gap between those already on board the "specifically
political consensus" (40) which she advocates and those who are not.
It is often the very agreement that some kinds of human functioning
(sexuality, emotion, practical thought) are truly fundamental and
central that has made disagreement about their proper role in human
lives, or their proper distribution in human communities, so charged
and often so intractable. It seems that Nussbaum herself is implicitly
conceding this as she annexes appeals to dignity and rights that do not
arise out of but provide one kind of normative engine for driving an
ethics whose content is capabilities.
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This big book is swelled by several pieces it did not need. An
essay on "Equity and Mercy" is an interesting reflection on justice but
makes little contact with the topic of the book; a review of Andrea
Dworkin is repetitive following a searching general essay on sexual
objectification, and one of Richard Posner adds little to the book's
arguments; an encomium to Sir Kenneth Dover, to whom the book is
dedicated, is out of place; and a concluding piece on Virginia Woolf
and our knowledge of other people is lovely but related only in the
most oblique way to the matters under discussion. Some of these 70
pages might have been devoted to trim and forceful closing arguments
in keeping with both the overall style and the aim. Readers will find
more than enough here to test their logical wits, moral sympathies,
and political convictions where "sex" is at issue.
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